The Faculty of Shariah and Law at Villa College hosted Dr. Aarti Kalnawat, Associate Professor at Symbiosis Law School Nagpur, India, for a guest lecture on General Defences: Consent as a Defence to Harm on 12 April 2026. Delivered as part of the Criminal Law module within the Villa College Law Lecture Series, the two-hour evening session was held at HB 103, Hospitality Building, and was open to Villa College students through walk-in registration.
The question of whether a person can consent to being harmed, and whether that consent should relieve the person who inflicts the harm of criminal liability, is one of the most intellectually contested doctrines in criminal law. On its surface, the principle appears straightforward: if an individual freely agrees to an act that results in harm, the law might reasonably conclude that no wrong has been committed. In practice, however, the doctrine confronts the legal system with a series of deeply uncomfortable questions about where the boundaries of personal freedom lie and at what point the state is justified in overriding an individual's choices for the protection of that individual or of society at large. Dr. Kalnawat's lecture examined the scope and limits of consent as a defence, the critical distinction between consent and mere submission, the public policy considerations that restrict the defence in cases of serious harm, and the evolving jurisprudence across contexts including contact sports, medical treatment, sexual activity, and body modification.
The distinction between consent and submission is particularly significant because it determines whether the defence is even available in a given case. Consent, in the legal sense, requires a free, informed, and voluntary agreement. Submission, by contrast, may involve acquiescence under pressure, fear, or a power imbalance that vitiates the quality of the apparent agreement. A patient who agrees to a surgical procedure after a full explanation of its risks and alternatives has consented. A person who yields to an act of harm because they feel they have no realistic choice has submitted. The law treats these two situations very differently, and the line between them is often the central factual and legal dispute in cases where consent is raised as a defence.
The lecture's analysis of case law centred on a sequence of English decisions that have shaped the modern boundaries of the doctrine. The landmark House of Lords decision in R v Brown significantly curtailed the scope of consent as a defence to actual and grievous bodily harm. The case established that consent could not operate as a defence where the harm inflicted was serious, even between willing adult participants, on the grounds that the public interest in preventing such harm outweighed individual autonomy. The decision was and remains controversial, precisely because it draws a line that many legal scholars and human rights advocates consider paternalistic. Subsequent cases introduced important qualifications and tensions. R v Wilson, which concerned consensual branding between spouses, reached a different conclusion, with the court distinguishing the facts from those in Brown and recognising the act as falling within the category of personal adornment rather than gratuitous violence. R v Konzani addressed the question of consent in the context of the transmission of serious disease through sexual activity, raising further questions about what constitutes informed consent when material information has been withheld. Taken together, these cases illustrate that the law in this area is not governed by a single coherent principle but by a series of context-specific judgments that attempt to balance competing interests on a case-by-case basis.
The underlying tension that runs through all of these decisions is the conflict between individual autonomy and what the law terms the state's paternalistic interest in protecting citizens from harm. This is not a debate confined to criminal law. It has profound implications for human rights law, public health policy, and the regulation of personal conduct more broadly. The autonomy position holds that competent adults should be free to make choices about their own bodies and lives, including choices that others may regard as harmful or unwise, provided those choices do not harm third parties. The paternalistic position holds that the state has a legitimate interest in setting minimum standards of physical integrity that cannot be waived by consent, on the grounds that permitting individuals to consent to serious harm undermines broader social norms and may create pressure on others to submit to similar treatment. Neither position is without difficulty. Unqualified autonomy risks legitimising exploitation under the guise of consent. Unqualified paternalism risks infantilising adults and criminalising conduct that involves no unwilling victim. The evolving jurisprudence in areas such as contact sports, where significant physical harm is routinely consented to and legally permitted, and body modification, where the boundaries remain contested, reflects the ongoing difficulty of drawing a principled and consistent line.
The session generated active and sophisticated discussion among students, many of whom engaged with the broader ethical and policy dimensions of the topic. This level of engagement reflects the analytical environment that the Faculty of Shariah and Law cultivates, one in which students are expected not merely to learn legal rules but to interrogate the principles and assumptions that underlie them. Criminal law, perhaps more than any other area of legal study, demands this kind of critical engagement because its doctrines directly implicate fundamental questions about the relationship between the individual and the state.
This guest lecture was delivered as part of the ongoing academic collaboration between Villa College and Symbiosis Law School Nagpur under their formal Memorandum of Understanding for internationalisation, cross-border faculty exchange, and knowledge sharing. The partnership continues to provide Villa College students with access to legal scholarship drawn from traditions and case law beyond the Maldivian jurisdiction, broadening the comparative perspective that is increasingly essential to competent legal practice.
The Faculty of Shariah and Law extends its appreciation to Dr. Aarti Kalnawat for her contribution to the Law Lecture Series.
